中華佛學學報第17期 頁267-302 (民國93年)，臺北：中華佛學研究所，http://www.chibs.edu.tw
Chung-Hwa Buddhist Journal, No. 17, pp. 267-302 (2004)
Taipei: The Chung-Hwa Institute of Buddhist Studies
William Magee, Ph.D.
Chung-Hwa Institute of Buddhist Studies
This paper describes how Nāgārjuna (klu grub, first to second century C.E. ) in his Treatise on the Middle (mūlamadhyamakakarikāḥ) refutes the existence of “own-being” (svabhāva, rang bzhin), or inherent existence, in reliance on a logical method referred to by later Tibetan exegetes as “expressing the fallacy from the viewpoint of a pervader.” Using this method, one does not directly refute the putative entity of own-being itself, but instead one points to numerous absurd consequences of own-being in order to describe how our world would be if, in fact, its mode of subsistence were own-being. Examples are taken from Nāgārjuna's analyses of motion and production. Philosophers discussed in this paper are in the Indian and Tibetan traditions of the Buddhist Middle Way School, including Chandrakīrti (zla ba grags pa, seventh century), considered by many to be the founder of the Middle Way Consequence School (prāsaṅgika-mādhyamika) and Dzong-ka-ba Lo-sang-drak-ba(1359-1417), founder of the Tibetan Ge-luk lineage. According to these thinkers, the import of Nāgārjuna's thought is that all phenomena exist as mere imputations, without being established from their own side. Thus, while asserting that there is no own-being, Nāgārjuna details the impossibility of own-being through expressing its fallacy from the viewpoint of a pervader, i.e., something broader. For instance, if motion had own-being, then all motion would be findable under analysis. Being findable under analysis is broader than own-being, and thus is a “pervader.” Other pervaders of own-being are permanence, stability, and a lack of dependence on causes and conditions. Thus, an inherently existent chair would have the three attributes of being non-fabricated, independent, and immutable. Although
there are limitless examples, this paper primarily lists the putative consequences of own-being in the analysis of production known as the vajra nodes, which searches for a findable mode of production that would involve a thing being produced either from itself, from causes that are inherently other than it, from causes that are both self and other, or causelessly. In addition, this paper discusses some mistaken ideas about Nāgārjuna's method as asserted by some non-Tibetan scholars, refuting in particular the assertion that the import of Nāgārjuna's intention is to refute Hindu philosophical assertions.
關鍵詞： 1.Indo-Tibetan Buddhism 2.Mādhyamika 3.Nāgārjuna 4.svabhāva 5.Dzong-ka-ba
In this paper I will describe how Nāgārjuna(1st-2nd C.E.), and other Middle Way SchoolBuddhist philosophers of India and Tibet refute the existence of a self of phenomena, referred to as own-being,through relying in part on arguments expressing the fallacy of own-being from the viewpoint of a pervader. In this type of argument one does not directly refute the putative entity of own-being itself (as is done in other Middle Way School reasonings), but instead one points to numerous absurd consequences of own-being in order to reduce to impossibility the existence of own-being.
Buddhism's Middle Way School is a Great Vehiclephilosophical system derived from the Buddha's middle wheel Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras. The Middle Way School purports to describe how phenomena exist imputedly, avoiding the two extremes of true establishment and non-existence. In this school, according to Dzong-ka-ba Lo-sang-drak-ba (1359-1417), founder of the Tibetan Ge-luk lineage, each material and mental phenomenon in the universe is asserted to exist imputedly, as a mere designation, without being established from its own side. Nothing exists by way of its own entity; everything is empty of own-being; things exist only as names and conventions.
Even within Buddhist philosophical schools, there are many who feel that existing only as an imputation does not fulfill the meaning of existing. For them, existence implies a world of solid reality, not a world of mere names. The Middle Way School answers this by saying that most people cherish exagerated notions of the meaning of existent. Middle Way reasonings demonstrate through analysis the unfindability of such a solid world. From this perspective, the Middle Way School assertion that all
things are merely imputed by names and terms is not so strange. In fact, it is the assertion of substantial existence that comes to be regarded with suspicion.
Although the Middle Way School makes the point that empty things are unfindable under analysis, it also asserts a presentation of cause and effect. How can a world of merely imputed entities also be a world in which specific causes lead to their own effects? If all is imputation, cannot anything be anything?
All things existing as imputations does not mean that anything can be anything. Rather, it means that phenomena exist interdependently with mind. Because they exist interdependently with mind they do not have inherent, independent existence and instead exist dependently. Lacking the own-being they would have with independence, things exist only conventionally.
Convinced that this is a valid mode of being, Dzong-ka-ba's Great Exposition sets forth three criteria for something to exist in conventional terms:
1. it must be well-known to conventional consciousness
2. it must not be invalidated by a conventional valid cognition
3. it must not be invalidated by an ultimate valid cognition.
The first criterion is inclusive: it includes all the various things that normal people going about their daily lives consider existent. The second criterion excludes, for instance, a color-blind person's cognition of blue as gray. The third criterion excludes inherent existence, which, although it is seen, is determined to be non-existent by an ultimate analytical consciousness.
Phenomena that are mere imputations therefore exist according to the Middle Way School. They exist even though their final mode of existence is emptiness: they are empty of inherent existence. Proponents of the Middle Way School are also called Proponents of Non-Entityness because they propound that phenomena have no entityness, that is, no true establishment or own-being.
The Middle Way school has two divisions: the Consequence School and the
Autonomy School. Ge-luk scholars consider the Consequence School to have the most profound assertions regarding emptiness. In this school, while things exist conventionally as names, their ultimate truth is an emptiness of a nature that is established by way of its own entity. Such a nature established by way of its own entity does not exist, but is only imagined to exist by innate ignorance conceiving of a self. A nature that is established by way of its own entity is what is meant by “own-being.”
The Middle Way Consequence School holds that realization of emptiness — the emptiness of own-being that is the final mode of subsistence of a thing — yields the wisdom that is the actual antidote to the ignorance that causes rebirth and suffering. Complete familiarity with emptiness leads to the omniscient consciousness of enlightenment. Without the correct view of emptiness, one is not released from bondage in cyclic existence.
Each phenomena consists of an ultimate truth— an emptiness of inherent existence — and a conventional truth, for instance a table. The table and its ultimate truth, the emptiness of the table, are related as being one entity and different isolates. In this way there are two truths for each phenomenon.
According to Dzong-ka-ba and other Ge-luk thinkers, an emptiness is a thing’s absence of inherent existence. The thing (for instance, a conventional truth such as a jar) and its emptiness (the ultimate truth of the jar) are one entity but differentiable to thought. This means that although a jar and its emptiness exist in the same time and place, thought can differentiate them. The emptiness of a thing such as a jar can be considered in isolation from the jar itself. This isolating process is also called a reverse. When one isolates a jar and its emptiness — approaching them in reverse as (1) not not jar and (2) not not emptiness of jar — it can be seen that they appear very differently to the mind. In this way, using the conceptual mind as an isolator, one is able to meditate on the emptiness of a jar without engaging the jar itself as an object of meditation.
In Tibet, not everyone agreed that a jar and its emptiness were one entity but different isolates. The Jonang school of “Other Emptiness” argues that the two truths are different entities. For them, an ultimate truth is empty of being a conventional truth (and vice-versa). Some other scholars felt that permanent phenomena could not be one entity with any impermanent phenomena. Nevertheless, they did not want to assert that a jar and its emptiness were completely different entities. Therefore, they claimed that the the two truths were “different in the sense of negating that they are one.” Thus, a third category of difference was added to the more usual two: different in the sence of being different entities, and different in the sence of being one entity but different isolates.
What would be the fault if a jar and its emptiness were different entities? The Ge-luk school adduces four faults:
1. if ultimate truths and conventional truths were different entities, the emptiness of a jar would not be the ultimate nature of the jar
2. if ultimate truths and conventional truths were different entities, realization of the emptiness of the jar would not overcome the misapprehension of the jar as inherently existent
3. if ultimate truths and conventional truths were different entities, the non-affirming negative of true existence of a jar would not be the final nature of the jar
4. Buddhas would see jars as truly existent and would observe their emptiness elsewhere.These faults come down to the Ge-luk belief that a thing and its emptiness must be closely related within the same entity. If they are not, then realization of emptiness will not destroy ignorant misconceptions regarding that thing. For instance, the emptiness of the jar would be unrelated to the jar, and therefore realization of the emptiness of the jar would not destroy ignorant misconceptions regarding that jar.
Although Ge-luk doctrine insists that the two truths must be the same entity, they feel it is illogical that they be exactly the same. Therefore they are said to be different isolates. Although the Heart Sūtra seems to dispute this when it states that form is emptiness, Ge-luks feel that these words should not be accepted on their literal level.
There are other scriptural supports for the assertion that the two truths are not completely the same. For instance, the Sūtra Unravelling the Thought states:
The character of other-powered phenomena and the character of the ultimate Are free from being one or different.
Since being one isolate means being the same in both name and meaning, same isolate has the meaning of being identical, that is to say, being one. What would be the fault if a jar and its emptiness were exactly the same and not different isolates? Just as with the fault of being different entities, the Ge-luk school adduces four faults:
1. If ultimate truths and conventional truths were one isolate, everything true of one would also be true of the other. Thus, when ignorance was overcome on the path, emptiness would also be overcome.
2. If ultimate truths and conventional truths were one isolate, then just as, for instance, jars have different colors, shapes, and textures, so too their emptinesses would have different colors, shapes, and textures.
3. If ultimate truths and conventional truths were one isolate, then just as many conventional truths are afflictive, so too many ultimate truths would be afflictive.
4. If ultimate truths and conventional truths were one isolate, then just as children cognize conventional truths, so too they would also cognize ultimate truths.
In short, if ultimate truths and conventional truths were one isolate, there would be no need to strive for the realization of emptiness: jars would self-evidently be emptiness.
Moreover, since conventional truths are afflictive, ultimate truths would be afflictive. It seems that liberation could be achieved without effort, but on the other hand emptiness would not be liberative. How could such a situation exist? The Ge-luks say it could not. Therefore, although a jar and its emptiness must have the close relationship afforded by being one entity, they must also be different; a difference that exists within a relationship of one entity. Thus, they are said to be different isolates. Nothing that is a jar is also the emptiness of the jar, and nothing that is the emptiness of the jar is qualified to hold water. They exist together at the same time and in the same place but they can be isolated from each other conceptually. In this way the jar and the emptiness of the jar can related without being one thing. This is necessary since the Ge-luks assert that the jar is a positive phenomena whereas the emptiness of the jar is a negative.
By saying that a jar is a positive phenomenon, we mean that it is manufactured, impermanent, specifically characterized, and the effect of causes and conditions. The emptiness of this same jar, on the other hand, is a negative phenomenon, like all emptinesses. Negative phenomena are permanent (in the sence of unchanging: they are not eternal), they are not the effects of causes and conditions, and they are only generally characterized.
For Ge-luk philosophers, both positive phenomena and negative phenomena are existent because they are observed by valid cognitions. Positives and negatives are ontologically equal in the sense of being empty of inherent existence. Thus, the differentiation between positives and negatives does not lie in their mode of subsistence. Rather, the division is made by way of how these objects appear to the conceptual mind. Negatives are cognized through explicitly eliminating an object-to-be-negated. Hopkins makes the point that “to realize non-cow, cow must be openly eliminated, but to realize cow, non-cow does not have to be explicitly eliminated though indeed it is implicitly eliminated. Thus, non-cow is a negative phenomenon and cow is a positive phenomenon.”
Negatives can be divided into affirming negatives and non-affirming negatives. With affirming negatives, something is left over after the elimination. For instance, the affirming negative “the fat Devadatta does not eat during the day” affirms that he eats during the night. Unlike this sort of negative, the non-affirming negative leaves nothing to be affirmed after the elimination. Emptiness is a negative phenomenon because it is an absence of svabhāva that is cognized through the explicit elimination of an object-to-be-negated. Within being a negative, emptiness is said to be a non-affirming negative because nothing remains following the refutation of inherent existence, the object-to-be-negated. Emptiness is a mere absence of inherent existence in a thing. It is sometimes called the emptiness nature.
Emptiness is said to be non-affirming because it is the mere elimination of the object-to-be-negated, svabhāva. It is important for Consequentialists to realize an emptiness that is a non-affirming negative because if emptiness were an affirming negative, something would always be left over to be investigated, and thus there would never be a point at which the meditator could complete the realization. For instance, if jar were to remain after determining the emptiness of jar (which might happen if emptiness was an affirming negative), then jar would be its own nature and would truly exist. The ultimate analysis would have yielded a truly existent jar.
Every emptiness of inherent existence is a mere absence of the the object-to-be-negated, inherent existence. Inherent existence is sometimes called the object-to-be-negated nature. This non-existent object-to-be-negated nature is only one type of svabhāva. Dzong-ka-ba describes this type of svabhāva as “a thing’s establishment by way of its own entity:”
There does not exist in phenomena even a particle of the nature that is establishment by way of a thing’s own entity.
The object-to-be-negated nature does not exist as an external reality. However, although nothing is established by way of its own entity, the object-to-be-negated nature is imagined to exist by ignorance.
The object-to-be-negated nature does not exist, but the absence of the object-to-be-negated nature does exist. This is the emptiness nature. It is important to note here that there are opposing usages of the term svabhāva:
(1)A non-existent, object-to-be-negated nature (dgag bya’i rang bzhin) that is an object’s establishment by way of its own entity (rang gi ngo bos grub pa).
(2)An existent, reality nature (rang bzhin chos nyid) that is a phenomenon’s ultimate truth (don dam bden pa) or emptiness (stong pa nyid).
There are also other usages of svabhāva to be found in Sanskrit literature.
Speaking of these two svabhāvas in terms of whether they exist or not, the svabhāva that is imagined to exist and that is the object of innate ignorance is itself non-existent. Although an ignorant consciousness fashions an appearance of it, that appearance has no existent referent in reality, because nothing is established by way of its own entity. The svabhāva that is emptiness does exist.
Just because things are empty of inherent existence does not imply that they do not exist. Things do not need inherent existence to exist. Instead, Ge-luks argue that they can and do exist imputedly, through dependence on names and mental imputations.
Moreover, if things did have inherent existence, their very existence would be rendered absurd by the bizarre (albeit putative) properties of inherent existence. This paper will delve more into these putative properties of svabhāva below.
Nāgārjuna propagated Great Vehicle teachings two millennia ago at Nālanda Monastic University in Magadha. Little is known of his life or times except for the extensive mythology surrounding him, complete with numerous prophesies of his birth from both sūtra and tantra literature. Even without historical data, the existence of such an extensive mythology clearly indicates the importance for the Mahāyāna of this earliest
Mahāyāna treatise author. Although the Buddha himself first propounded emptiness, Nāgārjuna is held to be the Chariot-way Opener of the Middle Way School because, as Jetsun Cho-gyi-gyel-tshen states in the Ocean Playground:
He composed the Six Collections of Reasonings for the sake of settling the stages of [realizing] emptiness — the explicit teaching of the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras — by way of innumerable reasonings.
Nāgārjuna's Treatise on the Middle explains the teachings on emptiness contained in the Buddha's Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras in order to:
… refute true existence, the object to be proven by Proponents of True Establishment who superimpose a [non-existent] self of persons and phenomena.
For students of the Middle Way School, one of the most highly valued aspects of the Treatise on the Middle is Nāgārjuna’s investigative method. Generally speaking, Nāgājuna's method is to employ ultimate analysis to determine the ontological status of things. Unlike conventional analysis — which inquires into what something is — ultimate analysis inquires into how something exists and searches for a findable mode of subsistence. Such analysis seeks an inherently existent essence or nature through examining objects or events for evidence of own-being. Thus, the sphere of ultimate analysis is limited to determining the presence or absence of inherent existence.
In practice, ultimate analysis always finds nothing, confirming the absence of inherent existence and thus the presence of emptiness. The reason that ultimate
analysis finds nothing is that it is engaged in a search for own-being or pervasive evidence of own-being. Since nothing has the type of own-being described by Nāgārjuna, ultimate analysis always finds just nothing. This non-finding of own-being is asserted by Middle Way scholars to be the finding of its absence, the emptiness of inherent existence.
An effective feature of Nāgārjuna’s ultimate analysis is the exposure of the impossibility of own-being through expressing the fallacy of own-being from the viewpoint of a pervader. A pervader here means something broader than the putative entity of own-being, such as a findable motion. Being findable under analysis is a putative consequence of own-being. If motion had own-being, then all motion would be findable under analysis. But Nāgārjuna demonstrates the unfindable nature of motion. For instance, if we assert inherent existence and then say that a goer is going, we should be able to find two goings: one would be the motion that causes us to say that there is a goer, and the other would be the motion of the going. Nāgārjuna states (stanza II.5):
When going is on the being-gone-over,
It follows there are two goings,
That by which there is a being-gone-over
And further the going on it.
Candrakīrti clarifies this statement by explaining that:
One going is that due to possession of which the path obtains the designation “the being-gone-over.” Then on the being-gone-over, which is the base of an action of going, there is a second going by which the path is gone over. When going is on the being-gone-over, it follows that there is this double going.
Although there are two goings there is only one goer. This is obviously absurd. Two findable goings are incongruous, as are all of the putative consequences of own-being.
Since the putative consequences of own-being are evidence of own-being, the presence or absence of own-being is easy to determine by searching for the presence or absence of incongruous consequences of own-being.
Dzong-ka-ba refers to this type of argument as “expressing fallacies from the viewpoint of a pervader.” His Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path states:
[Proponents of True Existence say that] things have a nature in the sense of establishment by way of their own entities. In response to that, [the Consequentialists] make the logical extension that “if things were established by way of their own entities, then they would not depend on causes and conditions, they would be immutable, and so forth.” Although there are many such logical extensions in Middle Way texts, those are cases of expressing fallacies from the viewpoint of a pervader [something wider]. This is not an identification of the object-to-be-negated from the viewpoint of its own entity.
Here Dzong-ka-ba is not speaking of motion but rather of a more general logical implication that if something is established from its own side then it must be established in a manner possessing the three attributes of non-fabrication, independence, and immutability. Asserting that any inherently existent thing (for instance, a chair) must possess these three attributes is a case of expressing the fallacy from the viewpoint of the pervader. Chairs are obviously not non-fabricated, independent, and immutable, but an inherently existent chair would have these three attributes. The logical extension demonstrates the impossibility of inherently existent chairs through ascribing incongruous putative consequences as pervaders of them.
In the case of the refutation of inherently existent motion in stanza II.5, the logical extension is that if motion were established by way of its own entity, then it would be vividly observable wherever it was asserted to exist and thus findable under analysis. Possessing the three attributes of non-fabrication, independence, and immutability is broader than being inherently existent just as being vividly observable and findable
under analysis is broader than being inherently existent. Here, broader is used in the sense that if we can refute that motion is not findable and so forth, we can perforce refute that it is inherently existent, reductio ad absurdum. Jam-yang-shay-ba (1648-1721), in the Four Interwoven Annotations to the Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path explains a little more about expressing the fallacy from the viewpoint of the pervader:
To someone who, for example, asserts that something that is not a pot is a pot, thinking that if it is refuted that this non-pot is a thing by saying “then it would be a thing” it would perforce refute its being a pot, for “thing” is wider and “pot” is narrower. Thinking such, [an opponent] expresses fallacy from the viewpoint of something wider: “It follows it is a thing.” However, this is not a case of identifying pot’s own entity, which is narrower.  Similarly, if someone asserts that things have establishment by way of their own entity — which is something narrower — this would entail that things have a nature possessing the three attributes, which is wider. Thinking such, from that point of view they draw an unwanted consequence, “They would be natures having the three attributes.” They are not identifying the entity of the special object-to-be-negated which is narrower, through the wider expression of fallacy. [390.1]
Jam-yang-shay-ba's example of refuting the pot through saying it is a thing is a little confusing here, since a pot is indeed a thing. To get his point across it might be helpful to substitute cat and feline for pot and thing. In that way we can paraphrase his statement so that it is more accessible:
To someone who, for example, asserts that something (i.e., a dog) that is not a cat is a cat, thinking that if it is refuted that this non-cat is a cat by saying “then it would be a feline” it would perforce refute its being a cat, for “feline” is wider and “cat” is narrower. Thinking such, [an opponent who knows it is a dog] expresses fallacy from the viewpoint of something wider: “It follows it is a feline [since you say it is a cat].”
Asserting the consequence that if the dog were a cat it would be a feline might help someone who thinks a cat is a dog to realize that it is not a cat, especially if that person understands the more general categories of felines and canines. Similarly, since — according to the Middle Way School — motion is merely imputed by terms and is not findable under analysis, we can effectively express the fallacy of inherently existent motion with the viewpoint of the pervader, findable motion, just as we can express the fallacy of thinking a dog is a cat by employing the pervader, feline. The analogy is that motion is not inherently existent because it is not findable just as dogs are not cats because they are not felines.
Both Dzong-ka-ba and Jam-yang-shay-ba also make the point that expressing fallacies from the viewpoint of a pervader is not an identification of the object-to-be-negated (i.e., being a cat or being an inherently existent chair) from the viewpoint of its own entity. What would be an identification of the object-to-be-negated from the viewpoint of its own entity? It seems to me that the reasoning of dependent-arising is a case of refuting own-being from the viewpoint of its own entity, as in the syllogism: “the subject, things, are not inherently existent because they are dependent-arisings.” In this case, the entity of inherent existence itself is being refuted directly, and not through the viewpoint of something wider.
Of the many reasonings employed by the Middle Way School, some refute inherent existence directly, from the viewpoint of own-being's own entity, and others refute inherent existence indirectly, from the viewpoint of a pervader. This paper will try to determine some of the putative consequences of own-being that arise from expressing the fallacy from the viewpoint of the pervader mainly through demonstrating the Vajra Nodes reasoning refuting “real” production.
Modern scholars such as Robinson and Hayes find Nāgārjuna's reasonings to be self-referential arguments that prove nothing. It seems to them that they are cheap confidence games, easily detected scams, and shoddy tricks. They feel that Nāgārjuna merely sets out to destroy the views of Hindu schools without correctly identifying those views. This belief is not shared by Dzong-ka-ba. In his opinion, Nāgārjuna's texts demonstrate a philosophical point of view that is capable of dispelling the innate ignorance that binds beings to cyclic existence. These two opinions of Nāgārjuna are strikingly incompatible. What
accounts for the great gulf between them? Part of the discrepancy lies in the fact that Robinson and Hayes mistakenly identify Nāgārjuna's putative consequences as “axioms.” These axioms are then unfairly ascribed to Nāgārjuna's opponents. For instance, Robinson notes that, for Nāgārjuna, phenomena possessing svabhāva must be “indivisible, manifest, and exist in isolation from all others.” Robinson scorns these three points as philosophical “axioms” and accuses Nāgārjuna of employing them dishonestly.
From Dzong-ka-ba's point of view, Robinson's misunderstanding lies in the fact that he has mistaken the putative consequences of own-being for philosophical ‘axioms.” He lacks a presentation explaining Nāgārjuna's logical method. Specifically, he does not understand that ultimate analysis searches for evidence of inherent existence, refuting the fallacy from the viewpoint of a pervader.
Another problem from Dzong-ka-ba's point of view arises with Richard Robinson's assumption — expressed in his article, “Did Nāgārjuna Really Refute All Philosophical Views” — that Nāgārjuna's intention is mainly concerned with refuting the views of other Buddhist or non-Buddhist philosophical schools. Robinson states:
The validity of Nāgārjuna's refutations hinges upon whether his opponents really upheld the existence of a svabhāva or svabhāva as he defines the term.
Although Robinson is convinced that Nāgārjuna's intention is focused upon refuting the systems of other philosophical schools, Dzong-ka-ba and his followers do not discuss Nāgārjuna's logical methods in the context of their primarily refuting other schools' views (though it sometimes accomplishes that as a secondary aim). Instead, they feel his intention is to undermine with logic the conceived object of innate ignorance — the conception that things are inherently existence. For instance, Dzong-ka-ba’s Great Exposition praises Nāgārjuna's texts in terms of their commenting on the profound meaning, emptiness, and not in terms of refuting other schools. The Great Exposition states:
Since the Superior Nāgārjuna, renowned in the three levels, was very clearly
prophesied by Buddha, the Supramundane Victor, himself in many sūtras and tantras as commenting on the profound meaning free from all extremes of existence and non-existence, the essence of the teaching, you should seek the view realizing emptiness based on his texts.
Here, Dzong-ka-ba is saying that Nāgārjuna's texts demonstrate a view that is capable of dispelling the innate ignorance that binds beings to cyclic existence. The Great Exposition further says:
When the view is delineated, one is to consider the refutation of the conceived object of innate ignorance to be the main point.
In Dzong-ka-ba's opinion, Nāgārjuna is refuting the conceived object of innate ignorance, not the tenets of some erroneous school of thought. For Dzong-ka-ba, this is an important aspect of Middle Way soteriology, connecting Nāgārjuna's analyses with the Buddhist path.
The question of whether Nāgārjuna is primarily refuting philosophical schools or not is an important one. If Nāgārjuna is primarily refuting philosophical schools, then, as Robinson remarks, “the validity of Nāgārjuna's refutations hinges upon whether his opponents really upheld the existence of a svabhāva or svabhāva as he defines the term.” However, if Dzong-ka-ba is correct in assuming that Nāgārjuna is refuting ignorant misconceptions about the self, then there is no necessity that Nāgārjuna's putative consequences be accepted by other philosophical schools. It is enough that they be putative consequences of an inherently existent self.
Richard Hayes, writing two decades after Robinson, agrees with his main points and also adds his own indictment, “the fallacy of equivocation.” Hayes states:
To the various fallacies and tricks brought to light by Robinson in his articles, we can now add the informal fallacy of equivocation as outlined above. That is, not only did Nāgārjuna use the term “svabhāva” in ways that none of his opponents did, but he
himself used it in several different senses at key points in his argument.
In Hayes' opinion, Nāgārjuna has eschewed standard logic for the deviant logic that employs the fallacies he and Robinson have outlined. These are some of the fallacies ascribed to Nāgārjuna by Robinson and Hayes:
1. Nāgārjuna is primarily concerned with refuting opponents' views.
2. Nāgārjuna defines his opponent’s views in a self-contradictory axiomatic way.
3. Nāgārjuna's axioms are at variance with common sense.
4. Nāgārjuna's axioms need to be accepted in their entirety by other philosophies but are not.
5. Nāgārjuna uses the term “svabhāva” in ways that none of his opponents do.
6. Nāgārjuna uses the term “svabhāva” in several different senses at key points in his argument.
These crucial assumptions by Robinson and Hayes are all considered incorrect by Dzong-ka-ba. In order to take the measure of their incorrectness according to Dzong-ka-ba, let us reduce these six assumptions to three basic assumptions about Nāgārjuna:
7. Nāgārjuna is primarily concerned with refuting opponents' views.
8. Nāgārjuna employs axioms that are at variance with common sense.
9. Nāgārjuna uses the term “svabhāva” in several different senses at key points in his argument.
Ge-luk scholars do not ascribe these fallacies to Nāgārjuna because they do not share Robinson's and Hayes' crucial assumptions about the purpose and method of Nāgārjuna's intention. Thus, none of these fallacies applies to Nāgārjuna as far as Dzong-ka-ba and his followers are concerned. Rather, they hold the following to be true of Nāgārjuna:
10. Nāgārjuna is primarily concerned with refuting innate ignorance, even though Nāgārjuna's logical methods damage some Buddhist and non-Buddhist positions.
11. Nāgārjuna does not employ axioms but rather the putative consequences of inherent existence to express the fallacy of own-being through the viewpoint of a pervader.
12. Nāgārjuna employs the term “svabhāva” in two senses. In the Treatise on the Middle Chapter XV.1-2, Nāgārjuna uses the term “svabhāva” to refer to an existent reality nature, emptiness. At other times, he uses it to mean inherent existence.
Dzong-ka-ba's assumptions about Nāgārjuna are opposed to those of Robinson and Hayes. On the one hand, Robinson's and Hayes' opinions cast Nāgārjuna as a charlatan. On the other hand, Dzong-ka-ba regards Nāgārjuna as “the first great name in Buddhist thought since the Buddha.”Separating these two understandings is the realization that Nāgārjuna does not employ philosophical axioms that are at variance with common sense, but rather uses ultimate analysis to search for the putative consequences of svabhāva. Indeed, the putative consequences of own-being are at variance with common sense; that is precisely Nāgārjuna's point in using them. He means to show the impossibility of the existence of own-being through expressing the fallacy of own-being from the viewpoint of the pervader.
The identification and use of these pervaders — the putative consequences of svabhāva — can be thoroughly demonstrated by referring to their employment in the well-known refutation of inherently existent production known as the vajra nodes, sometimes referred to as “refuting production by the four extreme [types].”
In general, the various reasonings presented in Middle Way texts can be divided into two types: reasonings refuting a self of persons and reasonings refuting a self of phenomena other than persons. As Jang-ḡa (1717-1786) states in his Presentation of Tenets:
This is because the bases of adherance to the two selves — which are the chief of those things that bind one in cyclic existence — are persons and phenomena and, therefore, the main bases with respect to which selflessness is ascertained must also be persons and phenomena.
In this context, the person is that object that generates the thought “I” and phenomena other than persons refers not to houses and cars but to the phenomena included within the continuum of the person, the mental and physical aggregates of the person. From within the many reasonings refuting the self of phenomena, the main one is considered to be the vajra nodes. Jang--ḡya gives the origin of the vajra nodes reasoning settling the selflessness of phenomena as being the Sūtra on the Ten Grounds:
For, when the Superior Nāgārjuna explained the thought of the statement in the Sūtra on the Ten Grounds where it says that a bodhisattva enters onto the sixth ground through the ten samenesses, he considered that through only demonstrating with reasoning that all phenomena are the same in being without [inherently existent] production, the other samenesses would be easily demonstrated.
The ten samenesses expressed in the sūtra are different ways in which all things equally have no inherent existence. Nāgārjuna’s Treatise on the Middle, Chapter One (“Analysis of Conditionality” ) and elsewhere explains this just lack of inherent
production mentioned in the sūtra because it is the easiest pathway to an understanding of the other nine samenesses. However, for our purposes the investigation into production is useful not only for its insights into the empty nature of production, but also for the study of Nāgārjuna’s use of putative qualities of inherent existence. This is because the vajra nodes clearly and vividly demonstrates the process of ultimate analysis through conducting an exhaustive search for the putative properties of inherently existent production.
The vajra nodes refutes svabhāva by refuting that things have “real” production (i,e., production that can be found under analysis) from causes that are (1) the same as their effects, or (2) other than their effects, or (3) both, or (4) production without causes. Ruegg identifies this type of four-cornered reasoning as a tetralemma (catuṣkoṭi) in which:
... the nature of a postulated entity and its relation to a predicate is investigated in such a way that all conceptually imaginable positions are exhausted; for an entity and its predicate can be conceptually related only in terms of these four limiting positions.
In the case of the refutation of production by the four extreme types, the “nature of a postulated entity” is inherently existent things and its relation to a predicate is that these must be produced from self, other, both, or causelessly. The thesis — that things are not inherently produced — has the meaning of the emptiness discoursed upon by the Buddha in the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras.
The four refutations of true production from self, other, both and causelessly are able to prove that things are not inherently produced because these four represent all possibilities of true production. All positions are exhausted because:
●production is either caused or uncaused
●if caused, cause and effect are either the same entity, ifferent entities, or both the same and different.
Since the possibilities of production of inherently existent entities can be limited in this way, then when all four are refuted, all possibility of the production of such entities is refuted. As Napper argues, Dzong-ka-ba accepts the “law of the excluded middle” when he asserts a definite enumeration of possibilities in such tetralemmas. Because of this exhaustive delineation of all possibilities of inherent production, Ge-luk exegetes assert that when the four extreme types are refuted, true production is perforce refuted.
Although the tetralemma exhausts possibilities of true production, it is not exhaustive regarding possibilities for production in general. This is because the tetralemma does not refute conventionally existent production from other. Conventionally existent production of effects from causes that are conventionally other is not refuted by the vajra nodes because the vajra node is an ultimate analytical reasoning. From the Ge-luk perspective, absence of the putative consequences of inherent existence — which are the objects searched for by the vajra nodes — does not disprove imputed production that exists only conventionally. Imputed production from other that exists only conventionally is asserted in the Ge-luk system.
In his root text to the Great Exposition of Tenets, Jam-yang-shay-ba introduces the refutation of production from causes that are the same as their effects. This is sometimes called “self production”:
If [things] were produced from themselves
[Their re-production] would be purposeless and endless.
That which [already exists in something] is not [produced from] it,
Causes and effects would always be seen,
It would contradict worldly perception,
All objects and agents [of production] would be one.
Self production involves the faults that (1) re-production would be purposeless and endless, (2) that which already exists in something is not produced from it, (3) causes and effects would always be seen together, (4) it would contradict worldly perception that sees causes and effects as different, and (5) all objects and agents of production would be one.
Buddhapālita’s commentary on Nāgārjuna’s Treatise provides an important early commentarial source:
Things are not produced from their own entities because if they were their production [again] would be just purposeless and because production would be endless ... [why? (1)] the production again of things already existing in their own entities is purposeless ... [and (2)] if, although existent, they are produced, they would never not be produced.
Buddhapālita’s Commentary addresses the two primary reasons refuting production from self: purposeless production and endless production. Candrakīrti’s Introduction to (Nāgārjuna’s) ‘Treatise on the Middle Way’ presents a more detailed discussion of these two as well as other reasons used to refute self production:
There is no point in the production of something from itself [that is, from a cause that is the same entity as itself because it would have already attained existence] . Also, it is just not reasonable that what already has been produced be produced again. If it is thought that the already produced is produced again, the growing of a sprout, etc., would not be found here [in the world]; the seed would be produced endlessly.
How could that [seed] be destroyed by that [sprout? For, according to you,
seed and sprout are not other.] For you, the sprout’s shape, color, taste, capacity, and maturation would not be different from those of its creator cause, the seed. If, having forsaken the entity [of the state] of the seed, it becomes an entity [of a state] different from it, then how could it have the nature of that [seed]? If for you the seed is not other than the sprout here [in the world], just as the seed [is unapprehendable at the time of the sprout], the sprout would not be apprehendable. Or, because they are one, just as the sprout [is apprehendable], so the seed would be apprehendable [at the time of the sprout]. Therefore, this [non-otherness of the seed and sprout] is not to be asserted.
Though the cause is destroyed, the effect is seen; thus, even the world does not assert that they are one. Therefore, this ascription of things arising from self is not admissible in reality or even in the world.
If production from self were asserted, the produced and the producer—object and agent—would be one. Since they are not one, production from self is not to be asserted because of the fallacies extensively explained [here and in Nāgārjuna’s Treatise].
In this quotation, Candrakīrti expands upon Buddhapālita’s reasonings to posit further arguments against the existence of production from self.
Regarding purposeless production, Candrakīrti begins his argument by asserting that production occurs for the sake of a thing attaining its own entity. If that entity has already been attained, production of it again would be purposeless—it would not be needed. Thus, having attained production and needing production are contradictory and do not occur together.
For Candrakīrti, endless production will flow from causes that are the same entity as their effects. This is because if, although existent, a thing could be produced, then it would never not be produced. When cause and effect are the same entity, then the production of the effect will produce something that already exists in its own entity. If this occurs once, production could occur again and again ad infinitum. Endless production occurs when the already produced needs to be produced again. Two
consequences of endless production are that (1) sprouts will never be produced and (2) seeds will continuously be produced.
Besides these two reasons — that self production would be purposeless and endless — Candrakīrti mentions six more:
●the sprout could not cause the disintegration of the seed since they are not other
●the seed and the sprout would be the same with respect to shape, color, taste, and capacity
●the sprout would not have the same nature as the seed if it becomes the entity of a sprout
●causes and effects would be mutually apprehendable or non-apprehendable
●self-production would contradict worldly perception
●all objects and agents would be one.
Some scholars argue that Candrakīrti's reasonings are intended to refute the Hindu Sāṃkhya school assertion that causes and their effects are one nature. However, Ge-luk opinion is that Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti are not refuting Sāṃkhya philosophy per se but rather are positing the putative consequences that would ensue from causes and effects being the same entity. The non-finding of these putative consequences implies the absence of svabhāva and is taken as a proof of emptiness. As we can see from Candrakīrti's discussion, the putative consequences of svabhāva for self-production are:
●If a thing has svabhāva, it must be immutable, hence causes and effects must be simultaneous, and self-production would be purposeless or endless.
●If a thing has svabhāva, it must always not exist if it ever does not exist. Thus, having attained production and needing production are contradictory and do not occur together
●If a thing has svabhāva, it must be substantially existent such that causes could produce their effects endlessly. Also, the already produced would not need to be produced again.
●If a thing has svabhāva, it must be vividly observable separately from all other phenomena. Thus, the sprout must be seen in the seed.
Production from other in the context of the vajra nodes refers to production from inherently existent other. It is not intended to be a refutation of production from merely imputed other. In fact, production from merely imputed other is asserted in the Ge-luk system. There are three primary reasons refuting production from other:
1. the reason that everything would be produced from everything
2. the reason that the entities of things do not exist in their causes (Treatise, I.3)
3. the reason refuting “otherness.”
In addition, Jam-yang-shay-ba’s root verses put forth other reasons refuting production from other:
If things were produced from [what is inherently] other,
 Then darkness would arise from a flame,
And  all would arise from all,
Both causes and non-causes.
Because [cause and effect would be] other,
They could not be one continuum, like wheat and barley.
 Cause and effect would have to be simultaneous,
But because it is not so, what production
Is there of another from another?
The three consequences expressed here refuting production from other are that (1) darkness would be produced from a flame, (2) all would arise from all, and (3) cause and effect would have to be simultaneous. Jam-yang-shay-ba reveals the source of the first two of these to be in Candrakīrti’s Introduction:
It follows that thick darkness arises from a flame because another arises from what is inherently other.
Jam-yang-shay-ba also cites the verse in Nāgārjuna’s Treatise:
If there were an otherness of cause and effect
A cause would be the same as a non-cause.
For Jam-yang-shay-ba, inherently existent causes and effects must be simultaneous. This simultaneity would be due to two putative consequences of svabhāva (1) that things must be immutable (and thus eternal), and (2) there must be an entity of otherness in relation to which things are called “other.” A clear statement of this reasoning is found in Candrakīrti’s commentary in the Clear Words on stanza I.3 of Nāgārjuna’s Treatise:
The entities of the things [which are effects such as sprouts] do not exist in their causes [either collectively or individually or in something other than their causes]. If [the effect’s] own entity does not exist [at the time of its causes], then how could there be an entity of otherness [in the causes without the existence of the effect in relation to which they are called other]?
Within the context of inherently existent otherness, both phenomena involved in the otherness (cause and effect) must be existent for there to be an entity of otherness. Such an incongruous entity of otherness does not exist in fact, but is merely hypothetical, a putative consequence of svabhāva.
Regarding the consequence of darkness being produced from a flame: if an effect could be produced from a cause that is unrelatedly other from it, then it could be produced from anything that is not its cause. In that case, thick darkness could be produced from a flame. Moreover, if some cause, such as a flame, produced an effect that was an unrelatedly other, such as thick darkness, then it would produce all non-
Kay-drup’s Thousand Intervals presents an interesting analysis of production from other by way of the investigation of permanent and impermanent causes. Kay-drup reasons that if things are ultimately produced from other, they are either produced from permanent causes or impermanent causes. If things are produced from permanent causes, since it would be impossible for things to be produced in series, all effects would be simultaneously produced. Also, there would be the fallacies that a thing would be produced at all times, or it would not have been produced even one time.
On the other hand, if things are produced from impermanent causes they must be produced from causes which have ceased at the time of the effect or from causes that have not ceased at the time of the effect. In the first case — production from causes that have ceased at the time of the effect — the seed has disintegrated at the time of the effect. Since the state of disintegratedness of the seed is a non-thing, it is not reasonable that it be a cause, and hence the effect comes to be produced causelessly. In the second case — production from causes that have not ceased at the time of the effect — the seed has not disintegrated at the time of the effect. This means cause and effect would be simultaneous, which in turn obviates the possibility that cause and effect are producer and produced.
Ge-luks feel that production from other is refuted by these reasonings which seek to find some inherently existent production or otherness that is real in the sense of being established by way of its own entity. Inherent otherness is a thing that is not just a mere designation, but has findability, since findability under ultimate analysis is a putative consequence of svabhāva.
The following putative consequences of svabhāva were employed in the refutation of production from other:
●If a thing has svabhāva, it must have one unchanging entity. This means that effects that are other are unrelated to their causes.
●If a thing has svabhāva, it must always not exist if it ever does not exist
●If a thing has svabhāva, it must be substantially existent.
●If a thing has svabhāva, it must be vividly observable separately from all
●If a thing has svabhāva, it must be simultaneous with its causes and conditions
●If a thing has svabhāva, there must always be an entity of otherness with respect to which it is other
●If a thing has svabhāva, that thing must be findable under analysis.
●Impermanent causes must be existent or non-existent at the time of their effect.
It must be remembered that this limb of the tetralemma refutes inherently other production. It is not meant to damage the merely nominal, i.e., imputed production that is asserted by Dzong-ka-ba. Ge-luks assert conventionally existent production from merely nominal others. This type of production does not withstand ultimate analysis, but it is the type of production that is found by conventional analysis, which asks such questions as, “what kind of tree will grow from an apple seed?”
The third part of the tetralemma—production from both self and other—is a composite of the first two parts refuting (1) self production and (2) production from other. The putative consequences of both are employed in the search.
Like other types of production, causeless production has its proponents. For instance, the Nihilists of Indian philosophy admit that some phenomena are seen to be caused, as in the making of a jar by a potter, but they say natural phenomena arise just through their own natures. For instance, a Nihilist would assert that the sharpness of thorns arises causelessly (Buddhists assert that the sharpness of the thorn is caused by the same seed that engenders the rose).
Nihilists also refute future lives arising from present virtuous and unvirtuous causes. For this they draw sharp criticism from Buddhists, who assert that virtuous and non-virtuous actions lead to pleasant and painful effects respectively—a presentation that is at the basis of Buddhist ethics. Jam-yang-shay-ba’s root text puts forth three reasonings refuting the possibility of causeless production:
If things were produced causelessly,
Exertion would be senseless.
It would contradict perception.
All would be produced from all.
The first reason, that exertion would be senseless, is an appeal to accept the meaningfulness of human endeavor:
It [absurdly] follows that planting seeds, cooking food, and engaging in commerce for the sake of the arising of temporary and final effects are purposeless  because, though there are no causes, effects arise.
Jam-yang-shay-ba suggests that the activities of the world should not be demeaned as purposeless. Much of human civilization is based on sensible manipulation of causes through exertion, at least in the areas mentioned here pertaining to agriculture, nutrition, and trade. Denigrating this sensibility runs counter to common sense.
The second reason, that causeless production would contradict perception, is also an appeal to everyday experience. For instance, we see that seeds grow into certain trees, and thus those seeds are seen to be the cause of those trees. As Jam-yang-shay-ba remarks, causeless production not only contradicts what is seen by the world, it strongly contradicts what is seen by the world. Candrakīrti’s Introduction says:
If it is viewed that [things] are produced only causelessly, then everything would always be produced from everything, and for the sake of the arising of certain effects the world would not gather seeds and so forth, doing many hundreds of things [for the sake of those effects].
A third reason refuting causeless production is that if nothing is the cause of anything, all could be produced from all. Even non-causes could be producers. Jam-yang-shay-ba describes the consequence of non-causes becoming producers in a world where
causes do not engender their own effects:
Then just as a bread-fruit tree, for instance, would not be the cause of its own fruit, so because all things, such as lemon and mango trees, are also not causes of bread-fruit, bread-fruit would be producd from them because they are equally non-causes in relation to bread-fruit.
If causes do not produce discrete effects then production becomes chaotic and random. In fact, all things may produce all other things, since they are equally non-causes in a world of causeless and hence unpredictable production. A pernicious consequence of causeless production would be that virtuous and non-virtuous causes do not produce discrete results, such that non-virtuous actions come to fruition as pleasure, while the happiness that should be the effect of virtue is lost.
We have seen that the vajra nodes reasoning expresses the fallacy of inherently-existent production from the viewpoint of numerous pervaders. To expose the fraud of inherent existence, the vajra nodes postulate pervaders — the putative consequences of inherent production — and searches for them. The non-finding of these pervaders constitutes finding the absence of true production. However, it does not constitute finding the absence of imputed production, which does exist.
In the course of discrediting inherently-existent production, the vajra nodes identifies and employs ten putative consequences of svabhāva to express the fallacies of inherent production from the viewpoint of a pervader:
(1)If a thing has svabhāva, it must be immutable.
(2)If a thing has svabhāva, it must not depend on another.
(3)If a thing has svabhāva, it must always be existent or non-existent.
(4)If a thing has svabhāva, it must be substantially existent.
(5)If a thing has svabhāva, it must be vividly observable separately from all other phenomena.
(6)If a thing has svabhāva, it must have one unchanging entity.
(7)If a thing has svabhāva, it must be simultaneous with its causes and conditions.
(8)If a thing has svabhāva, there must always be an entity of otherness with respect to which it is other.
(9)Impermanent causes must be existent or non-existent at the time of their effects.
(10)If a thing has svabhāva, that thing must be findable under analysis.
In the vajra nodes reasoning these ten pervaders are the focus of the search for the truly existent “reality” of production.
The conclusion that true production is not findable may be startling to those who expect findability to be the mode of subsistence of all objects. Some, as we have seen, have considered this non-findability unacceptable, and the result of a “shell game.” Others have considered the possibility that production in general does not exist. Certainly there are a variety of opinions about Nāgārjuna’s analyses and what they negate. However, it is clear that the Ge-luk tradition feels that the vajra nodes refute only inherently existent production from self, other, both and causelessly and do not harm conventionally existent production from other. With conventionally existent production from other, merely imputed causes are seen to produce merely imputed effects that are designated “other.”
The vajra nodes tetralemma illustrates well the function of the pervader, the putative consequence of svabhāva, in Middle Way reasoning. The presence or absence of the pervader is used in ultimate analysis as a sign to determine the presence or absence of svabhāva. The ten putative consequences of svabhāva all flow from the most basic (hypothetical) quality of inherent existence: it is a type of existence that admits no dependence. The effort to imagine independent existence reveals these ten incongruities — findability, observability, and so forth. Their being putative outflows of inherent existence allows them to be the pervaders used to express the fallacy of inherent existence. Their absence is said to demonstrate the absence of inherent or true existence. The refutation of true existence is the purpose for which Nāgārjuna's Treatise on the Middle explains the teachings on emptiness contained in the Buddha’s Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras.
For works found in the Tibetan canon, ‘P’ refers to the Tibetan Tripitaka (Tokyo-Kyoto: Suzuki Research Foundation, 1955), which is a reprint of the Peking edition. For modern editions of Sanskrit texts of the Middle Way School and their Tibetan versions, as well as a more complete list of translations, see D.S. Ruegg’s The Literature of the Madhyamaka School of Philosophy in India (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrasowitz, 1981).
●Candrakīrti (zla ba grags pa, 6th-7th C.E.)
Clear Words Commentary on (Nāgārjuna’s) “Treatise on the Middle” (dbu ma rtsa ba’i ’grel pa tshig gsal ba, mūlamadhyamikavṛtti prasannapadā). P5260, Vol. 98. Tibetan edition: Dharamsala, Tibetan Publishing House, 1968. Sanskrit: Mūlamadhyamikakakārikā de Nāgārjuna avec la Prasannapadā Commentaire de Candrakīrti. Louis de la Vallée Poussin. Bibliotheca Buddhica IV. Osnabrück: Biblio Verlag, 1970.
Introduction to (Nāgārjuna’s) “Treatise on the Middle” (dbu ma la ’jug pa, madhyamakāvatāra). P5261, Vol. 98; P5262, Vol. 98. French translation: Louis de la Vallée Poussin, ed., Madhyamakāvatāra par Candrakīrti. Bibliotheca Buddhica IX. Osnabrück: Biblio Verlag, 1970. Also, French translation (to VI.165): Louis de la Vallée Poussin. Muséon 8 (1907): 249- 317; Muséon 11 (1910): 271- 358; Muséon 12 (1911): 235-328. English translation (Chapter VI): Geshe Rabten. Echoes of Voidness. London: Wisdom, 1983, 47- 92.
●>Dzong-ka-ba (tsong kha pa, 1357-1419)
Four Interwoven Annotations on (Dzong-ka-ba’s) “Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path,” The Lam rim chen mo of the incomparable Tsong-kha-pa (lam rim mchan bzhi sbrags ma / mnyam med rje btsun tsong kha pa chen pos mdzad pa’i byang chub lam rim chen mo’i dka’ ba’i gnad rnams mchan bu bzhi’i sgo nas legs par bshad pa theg chen lam gyi gsal sgron), with the interlineal notes of Ba-so Chos-kyi-rgyal-mtshan, Sde-drug Mkhan-chen, Ngag-dbang-rab-rtan, ’Jam-dbyangs-bshad-pa’i-rdo-rje, and Bra-sti Dge-bshes Rin-chen-don-grub. New Delhi: Chos-’phel-legs-ldan, 1972.
Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path / Stages of the Path to Enlightenment
Thoroughly Teaching All the Stages of Practice of the Three Types of Beings (lam rim chen mo; skyes bu gsum gyi rnyams su blang ba’i rim pa thams cad tshang bar ston pa’i byang chub lam gyi rim pa). P6001, Vol. 152. Also: Dharmsala: Shes rig par khang, no date.
The Illumination of the Thought, Extensive Explanation of (Candrakīrti’s) “Supplement to (Nāgārjuna’s) ‘Treatise on the Middle’” (dbu ma la ’jug pa’i rgya cher bshad pa dgongs pa rab gsal). P6143, Vol. 154. Also: Sarnath, India: Pleasure of Elegant Sayings Press, 1973.
Ocean of Reasonings, Explanation of (Nāgārjuna’s) “Treatise on the Middle” (dbu ma rtsa ba’i tshig le’ur byas pa shes rab ces bya ba’i rnam bshad rigs pa’i rgya mtsho). P6153, Vol. 156. Drashi-hlun-bo edition, Vol. ba, 316.5- 333.6. Also: Sarnath, India: Pleasure of Elegant Sayings Printing Press, 1973.
●Ḡön-chok-jik-may-wang-bo (dkon mchog ’jigs med dbang po, 1728-1791)
Precious Garland of Tenets / Presentation of Tenets, A Precious Garland (grub pa’i mtha’i rnam par bzhag pa rin po che’i phreng ba). The Collected Works of dkon-mchog-’jigs-med-dbaṅ-po, Vol. 6. New Delhi: Ngawang Gelek Demo, 1972, 485-535. English translation: Geshe Sopa and Jeffrey Hopkins. Cutting Through Apearances. Ithaca: Snow Lion Publications, 1994.
●Jam-yang-shay-ba (’jam dbyangs bzhad pa, 1648-1721)
Great Exposition of Tenets; Explanation of “Tenets,” Sun of the Land of Samantabhadra Brilliantly Illuminating All of Our Own and Others’ Tenets and the Meaning of the Profound [Emptiness], Ocean of Scripture and Reasoning Fulfilling All Hopes of All Beings (grub mtha’ chen mo / grub mtha’i rnam bshad rang gzhan grub mtha’ kun dang zab don mchog tu gsal ba kun bzang zhing gi nyi ma lung rigs rgya mtsho skye dgu’i re ba kun skong). Musoorie: Dalama, 1962. English translation (beginning of the Prāsaṅgika chapter) in: Jeffrey Hopkins. Meditation on Emptiness. London: Wisdom Publications, 1983.
●Jang-ḡya (lcang skya rol pa’i rdo rje, 1717-1780)
Presentation of Tenets / Clear Exposition of the Presentations of Tenets, Beautiful Ornament for the Meru of the Subduer’s Teachings (grub pa’i mtha’i rnam par
bzhags pa gsal bar bshad pa thub bstan lhun po’i mdzes rgyan). Varanasi: Pleasure of Elegant Sayings Press, 1970.
●Kay-drup Ge-lek-bel-sang-bo (mkhas sgrub dge legs dpal bzang po, 1385-1438)
Thousand Dosages / Opening the Eyes of the Fortunate, Treatise Brilliantly Clarifying the Profound Emptiness (stong thun chen mo / zab mo stong pa nyid rab tu gsal bar byed pa’i bstan bcos skal bzang mig ’byed). From The Collected Works of the Lord Mkhas-grub rje dge-legs-dpal-bzan-po, Vol. 1, 179-702. New Delhi: Mongolian Lama Gurudeva, 1980.
●Nāgārjuna (klu sgrub)
Fundamental Treatise Called “Wisdom” (dbu ma rtsa ba’i tshig le’ur byas pa shes rab ces bya ba, prajñānāmamūlamadyamakakārikā madhyamakaśāstra). P5224, Vol. 95. Sanskrit edition: J.W. de Jong, ed. Nāgārjuna, Mūlamadhyamakakārikāḥ. Adyar: Adyar Library and Research Centre, 1977.
●Nga-wang-bel-den (ngag-dbang-dpal-ldan, b. 1797; also known as Bel-den-chö-jay (dpal ldan chos rje)
Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-ba’s) “Great Exposition of Tenets,” Freeing the Knots of the Difficult Points, Precious Jewel of Clear Thought (grub mtha’ chen mo’i mchan ’grel dka’ gnad mdud grol blo gsal gces nor). Sarnath: Pleasure of Elegant Sayings Printing Press, 1964.
Ames, William. “The Notion of Svabhāva in the Thought of Candrakīrti.” Journal of Indian Philosophy 10 (1982).
Hayes, Richard P. “Nāgārjuna’s Appeal,” Journal of Indian Philosophy 22 (1994): 229-378.
Hopkins, Jeffrey. Buddhist Advice For Living & Liberation: Nāgārjuna’s Precious Garland. Ithaca: Snow Lion Publications, 1998.
Hopkins, Jeffrey. Emptiness Yoga. Ithaca, NY: Snow Lion Publications, 1987.
Hopkins, Jeffrey. Meditation on Emptiness. London: Wisdom Publications, 1983; 2nd edition, 1996.
Magee, William. The Nature of Things: Emptiness and Essence in the Ge-luk World. Ithaca, NY: Snow Lion Publications, 2000.
Napper, Elizabeth. Dependent Arising and Emptiness. London: Wisdom Publications, 1989.
Newland, Guy. The Two Truths. Ithaca: Snow Lion Publications, 1994.
Robinson, Richard H. “Did Nāgārjuna Really Refute All Philosophical Views?” Philosophy East and West 22 (1972).
Ruegg, David S. “The Uses of the Four Positions of the Catuṣkoṭi.” The Journal of Indian Philosophy 5 nos. 1/2.
Williams, Paul. Mahāyāna Buddhism. London: Routledge, 1989.
關鍵詞： 1.印度西藏佛教 2.中觀 3.龍樹 4.自性 5.宗喀巴
 tsong kha pa blo bzang grags pa.
 klu grup.
 dbu ma pa, mādhyamika.
 rang bzhin, svabhāva.
 theg chen, mahāyāna.
 pha rol du phyin pa’i mdo, prajñāpāramitāsūtra.
 btags yod, prajñaptisat.
 rtag mtha'.
 chad mtha'.
 tsong kha pa blo bzang grags pa.
 tha snyad du yod.
 Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path (lam rim chen mo) (Dharamsala: Shes rig par khang, 841.1- 2). Quoted in Guy Newland, The Two Truths (Ithaca, NY: Snow Lion, 1992), 84.
 don dam bden pa, paramārthasatya.
 ngo bo gcig ldog pa tha dad.
 ldog pa.
 gzhan stong.
 Newland, 62.
 Newland, 64-65.
 Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra, 3.26. Adapted from Newland, 66.
 Newland, 67.
 sgrup pa, vidhi.
 dgag pa, pratiṣedha.
 For some Tibetan scholars, “eliminate” means “not focus upon.”
 Hopkins, Meditation on Emptiness, 722. It is a good thing that implicit elimination is not enough to make a phenomenon negative, else all phenomena would be negative.
 paryudāsapratiṣheda, ma yin dgag.
 prasajyapratiṣheda, med dgag.
 This paper uses svabhāva and “own-being” equally.
 rang gi ngo bos grub pa.
 Great Exposition, 864.5:
chos rnams la rang gi ngo bos grub pa'i rang bzhin ni rdul tsam yang med do //
 Two recent publications have included parts of Nāgārjuna’s legend: (1) Jeffrey Hopkins, Buddhist Advice for Living and Liberation (Ithaca: Snow Lion Publications, 1998), 9-21 and (2) Gyel-tsap, Yogic Deeds of Bodhisattvas, commentary by Geshe Sonam Rinchen, translated and edited by Ruth Sonam (Ithaca: Snow Lion Publications, 1994), 11-15.
 Interestingly, in the Clear Words, Candrakīrti describes the purpose of Nāgārjuna's treatise as being a hermeneutical one. The Clear Words says:
This Treatise on the Middle was composed by the master [Nāgārjuna] for the sake of showing the difference between that requiring interpretation and the definitive.
 Zeno's paradox of motion might be called an ultimate analysis manqué. The analysis worked correctly, but Zeno did not understand the import of his non-finding of motion.
 Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path (lam rim chen mo) (Dharmsala: Shes rig par khang, no date), 861. Further research is required to determine the earliest usage of “expressing the fallacy from the viewpoint of the pervader.”
 'jam dbyangs bzhad pa.
 This list is taken from Robinson's list of six axioms in “Did Nāgārjuna Really Refute All Philosophical Views,” 327.
 Robinson, 326.
 Elizabeth Napper, Dependent-Arising and Emptiness, 159. Great Exposition, 766.3.
 Great Exposition, 391.1. My italics.
 Richard Robinson, “Did Nāgārjuna Really Refute All Philosophical Views,” 326.
 Richard P. Hayes, “Nāgārjuna's Appeal,” Journal of Indian Philosophy (22: 1994), 325.
 See William Magee, The Nature of Things: Emptiness and Essence in the Ge-luk World (Ithaca, NY: Snow Lion Publications, 2000).
 Paul Williams, Mahāyāna Buddhism: the Doctrinal Foundations (London: Routledge, 1989), 55.
 rdo rje gzegs ma.
 mtha’ bzhi skye ’gog.
 lcang skya rol pa'i rdo rje.
 Quoted by Jeffrey Hopkins in Emptiness Yoga (Ithaca, NY: Snow Lion Publications, 1987), 148.
 Hopkins, 150.
 rkyen brtag pa, pratyaya parīkṣā.
 Stanzas from Chapter XX, “Investigation of Collections” (tshogs brtag pa, sāmagrī-parikṣā), are also important in later Middle Way treatises on production — especially regarding production from other. Chapter XV on svabhāva should also be carefully examined, but keep in mind that Candrakīrti says that svabhāva refers to emptiness in Ch. XV.
 D. Seyfort Ruegg, “The Uses of the Four Positions of the Catuşkoṭi and the Problem of the Description of Reality in Mahāyāna Buddhism” (Journal of Indian Philosophy, Vol. 5 no. 1, 1977), 1.
 Elizabeth Napper, Dependent-Arising and Emptiness, 61.
 Jam-yang-shay-ba’s Great Exposition of Tenets, 80; Hopkins’ Meditation on Emptiness, 641.
 53P5242, 75.1.3- 75.2.2. See Meditation on Emptiness, 460-461, 642.
 P5262, 101.3.4, VI.8c-13; Poussin’s translation is Muséon, n.s. v.11, pp. 280-4. Brackets are from Candrakīrti’s own commentary, P5263, Vol. 98 120.3. 4ff.
 Jam-yang-shay-ba’s Great Exposition of Tenets, 83. Dharamsala edition, 923.5.
 Meditation on Emptiness, 644.
 Candrakīrti’s Introduction, VI.14.
 P5224, Vol. 95 3.1.5, I.5. Brackets are from Clear Words, P5260, Vol. 98 14.1.6, commenting on I.5.
 See José Cabezon, A Dose of Emptiness, 154.
 P5262, Vol. 98 101.5.2, VI.21; Poussin’s translation is Muséon, n.s. v. 12, p. 239. Candrakīrti's own commentary is P5263, Vol. 98 137.2.8.
 Hopkins, Meditation on Emptiness, 150.